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WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A GENERAL
STATUTE REVISIONq
Serious problems in statutory interpretation are raised by
conflicts between the law as enacted by the legislature and the
copies of the acts as printed in session laws, compilations, codi-
fications, and revisions. These conflicts may be due to changes
in the phraseology, to omissions, or to additions.
The simplest problem arises where there is a conflict between
the enrolled bill and a subsequent publication of the session laws
or acts of the legislature. In this case the original or enrolled
bill is the law.' Whether or not a statute has been recited incor-
rectly is a question of law of which the court will take judicial
notice.2 Tins result is not affected by the fact that the publica-
tion has been authorized by the legislature.3 A fortio, the
enrolled bill should take precedence over an unofficial compila-
tion or publication of the acts.
A different problem arises where there has been a legislative
adoption of the publication. It is well to note here that many
courts fail to make a proper distinction between an adoption and
an enactment when dealing with tins situation. The distinction
which should be recognized is clearly brought out in the case of
Lyman v. Martin,4 where, in discussing the effect of a legislative
adoption of a compilation, the court said, "That committee had
performed the duty assigned them, and the act passed simply
amounted to an approval of their work. It is plain that the
legislature did not intend that it should have any other or
further effect, and in law it did not. It was not a revision of the
law that had been authorized, but a compilation only If the
committee had included in the compilation any provision not
found among the old laws, and winch had never been passed by
the legislature, the legislative action above referred to would
not have given it any force or validity as a law."
I Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253 (1866), Eld v. Gorham, 20 Conn.
8 (1849), Morris v. City of Gainesville, 60 Fla. 338, 53 So. 739 (1910),
State v. Howell, 80 Wash. 692, 142 Pac. 1 (1914), Combs v. City of
Bluefield, 97 W Va. 395, 125 S. E. 239 (1924).
Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253 (1866).
'Taylor v. Ctucksaw County, 74 Miss. 23, 19 So. 834 (1896),
Stevens v. State, 70 Tex. Crim. Rep. 565, 159 S. W 505 (1913),
Lyman v. Martin, 2 Utah 136 (1879).
'2 Utah 136 (1879)
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In the ease of an adoption of a compilation, revision or
codification, the legislature usually merely passes a resolution to
the effect that the codification, revision or compilation shall
thenceforth constitute the prima fadie law of the state. The
codification is not before it in the form of a bill, or included in
the bill passed except by reference. Most, if not all state consti-
tutions require that any bill, in order to be enacted as law, must
be before the legislature, written out in full. This clearly is not
true of an adoption. For this reason an adoption can have no
posible effect upon the true law of a state other than making it
the prima facie law. In the case of an enactment, however, the
legislature is not merely passing upon the-act of another, but is
enacting the codification or revision word for word as the law of
the state. The content of the revision or codification is before the
legislature in full and is included in and a part of the bill
passed by that legislature.
Suffice it to say that an adoption has no true law-making
effect, but is merely an approval, usually for conveience in
citing sections in evidence or for revising by reference to section
number only, whereas an enactment creates in itself, and is
dependent upon no previous act for its force and effect.
Therefore, since the legislature in adopting a compilation of
prior acts in fact merely approved the work of the committee or
commission, and that only for the purposes intended to be served
thereby, it cannot be presumed that they intended to make that
publication the law, except insofar as it coincides with the
enrolled bills.
A third problem arises when the legislature enacts a com-
pilation or revision. A general statute revision is customarily
understood to signify or imply a re-examination of all previous
acts for the purpose of restating the law in an improved or
corrected form.5  The agent or commission whose appointment
is authorized by the legislature is generally instructed not to
change the law but merely to improve, clarify, and simplify it.
The cases dealing with this type of revision are numerous
and apparently irreconcilable. Many courts have said that since
the committee was -instructed not to change the law, the legisla-
ture did not intend a change to be made unless it was clearly
shown to the contrary, and the original act should be referred
IJernigan v. Holden, 34 Fla. 530, 16 So. 413 (1894).
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to when any question as to its meaning arises.6 The same result
is often reached where there has been an onnssion or an addition.7
Other courts have said that the enactment of a general statute
revision is an express repeal of prior statutes and in case of
conflict only those sections and sub-sections included in the
revision may be referred to.8 It is to be noted that in a few
instances decisions of the same jurisdiction are in conflict on this
question. It is difficult, however, to determine in many instances,
whether the cases are dealing with an enactment or an adoption.
It is submitted that the decisive factor is not what the legislature
authorized the commission to do, but rather, what the legislature
itself did.
If, when the legislature acted upon the bill proposing the
revision or compilation, it had the contents of the proposed
revision before it in the form of a bill and proceeded to enact
that bill word for word as it stood, referring to the sections of
such revision or compilation as making up a part of the bill
being passed, the result is that the revision or compilation
becomes the law of that state and all prior laws of a general and
permanent nature are thereby repealed by implication if found
to conflict with those enacted.9 This form of repeal by inplica-
tion would have no effect upon an omission where there was no
conflict, the prior law remaining in force in spite of its having
been omitted from the revision or compilation.
In determining whether or not an express repeal was
intended and in fact accomplished, reference must be had to the
enacting and repealing clauses. Although not a conclusive
indication, the wording of the enacting clause should serve as
an aid in determining the intent of the legislature in regard to
'State v. Holland, 117 Me. 288, 104 Atl. 159 (1918), Hugo v.
Miller, 50 Minn. 105, 52 N. W 381 (1892), McDonald v. Lincoln
County, 139 Neb. 188, 296 N. W 892 (1941), Berry v. State, 69 Tex.
Crn. Rep. 602, 156 S. W 626 (1913).
'In re Sullivan's Estate, 38 Ariz. 387, 300 Pac. 193 (1931), Car-
penter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362, 53 Pac. 842 (1898), Beatty v. Miller,
146 Ind. 231, 44 N. E. 8 (1896), Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 21 Ky.
Law Rep. 1444, 55 S. W 720 (1900); Hugo v Miller, 50 Minn. 105,
52 N. W 381 (1892), Ex Parte Copeland, 130 Tex. Crim. Rep. 59, 91
S. W (2d) 700 (1936), noted m 15 Tex. L. R. 145.8State v. Griffin, - Ariz. -, 118 P (2d) 676 (1941), In re
Todd's Estate, 17 Cal. (2d) 270, 109 P (2d) 913 (1941), Schwartz v.
Ritter, 186 Ill. 209, 57 N. E. 887 (1900), Buchannon v. Common-
wealth, 15 Ky. Law Rep. 738, 25 S. W 265 (1894), In re Craven's
Estate, 177 Minn. 437, 225 N. W 398 (1929).eVol. VIII, Blackstone Institute, at p. 435; 25 R.C.L. 924.
GENERAL STATUTE REVISION"
repeal of all prior legislation irrespective of conflict. If the
enacting clause is unqualified, i. e., where the revision is enacted
"as the law of the state," it would appear that the intent of the
legislature was to make the revision the only statutory law of
the state of a general and permanent nature.
However, the form and content of the repealing clause is a
factor of far greater importance and entitled to much more
weight in determining what the legislature actually did, than is
the enacting clause. It is the wording of this clause that should
ultimately indicate whether or not an express repeal was
intended and effected, or in short, whether or not the original
act has been so repealed that it no longer can be referred to or
considered, regardless of any conflict.
If the repealing clause is so worded as to repeal only those
prior statutes which are repugnant to those enacted, it is logical
to assume that the legislature did not intend to abolish completely
the prior law, since, in order to determine whether or not such
law is repugnant to those enacted, it must be referred to. Nor, in
this case, could omissions be considered as intentionally left out
unless to include them would destroy all effect of the revised
portion.
But, if the repealing clause expressly and unqualifiedly
"repeals all prior laws", it must be admitted that it was the
intent of the legislature to make this the only law, repealing not
only all conflicting laws, but those omitted as well, and this same
result should follow in cases involving additions or changes in
phraseology This conclusion would be still further strengthened
by the addition to the repealing clause, as is frequently done, of
certain specified exceptions where no repeal is intended, because
of the rule of statutory construction, snclusto unsus est exclusw
alterus, the enumeration of one is the exclusion of all others.
The above type of act has been held to create a true revised
code, passed as an original and independent act and as such
deriving all its authority, not from any previous acts, but from
the act of the legislature enacting the revision or compilation. 10
This problem is of particular interest and importance to the
lawyers and judges of Kentucky at this time.
"0State v. Griffin, - Ariz. -, 118 P (2d) 676 (1941), American
Indein. Co. v. Austin, 112 Tex. 239, 246 S. W 1019 (1922).
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In 1936 the General Assembly passed an act" which
provided for the appointment of a statute revision committee.
This committee was directed to "revise, codify, annotate and
publish the Statute Laws of Kentucky" and it was provided,
among other things, that "the committee shall not alter the
language or sense of any act of the General Assembly"
Pursuant to this authority, the committee employed an
expert m the field of statute revision, together with a staff who
undertook the accomplishment of this work.
After the committee had gone over the old statutes, the
General Assembly, at the suggestion of this committee, m 1940
repealed over one thousand sections and sub-sections of these old
statutes. However, from the revision submitted, not only were
those sections omitted, but well over 500 others, because, m the
opinion of the committee, they were obsolete, unconstitutional,
redundant, or had been repealed by implication. Also, m addi-
tion to those, the meaning of some of the remaining ones was
altered by the omission of certain words.
Then, too, the report of the Statute Revision Committee
which accompamed the proposed revision when it was submitted
to the General Assembly, admitted that changes in phraseology
had been made and that many sections and sub-sections had been
omitted. Also the committee there called attention to the fact
that the acts of tis revision were not to be construed in the light
of their predecessors, but that to do so would result only in
confusion.
Nevertheless, on February 27, 1942, the General Assembly
enacted this revision as "the law of the Commonwealth."12
This act has every appearance of an express repeal. The
enacting clause is worded so as to indicate that it was the legisla-
ture's intent that this revision be the only law since it said
"9 as the law of the Commonwealth" In addition thereto,
the repealing clause -which reads, "all statute laws of the Com-
monwealth of a general and public nature enacted prior to the
present session of the General Assembly (with specified excep-
tions), are hereby repealed", is clear and unqualified.
In short, all of the elements necessary to make up an express
repeal are present, including the additional strength of an
Kentucky Acts 1936, Ch. 111, p. 343.
-Kentucky Acts 1942, Ch. 208, p. 909.
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enumeration of specified instances where the General Assembly
did not intend a repeal.
There is present here, however, one element which likely will
not be found in other cases of statute revision, and that is
section 446.130 of the revised statutes which reads as follows
"The Kentucky Revised Statutes of 1942 are intended to speak
for themselves, and all sections of the Kentucky Revised Statutes of
1942 shall be considered to speak as of the same date, except that in
cases of conflict between two or more sections or of a latent or
patent ambiguity in a section, reference may be had to the Acts of
the General Assembly from which the sections are indicated to have
been derived, for the purpose of applying the rules of construction
relating to repeal by inplication or for the purpose of resolving the
ambiguity. Like reference may be had to any special Acts or char-
ters granted by the General Assembly prior to the adoption of the
present Constitution, for like purpose."
Taken in the light of the above section, even if the rule
propounded by some courts is accepted, that in all cases of
statutory revision there is a presumption against any intent to
change the law unless clearly indicated to the contrary, still tins
revision must take precedence over all prior statutes in cases of
conflict and must also be held to repeal all omitted statutes, since
no presumption can be raised in the face of an express provision
in the statute itself. This section permits reference to prior
statutes in only two instances, first, for the purpose of applying
the rules of construction relating to repeal by implication when
there is a conflict between sections included in the revision, and
second, for the purpose of resolving any latent or patent
ambiguity in a particular section.
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